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 The subject assigned to me, “The Future of State Regulation of Charities”, came with a 
request that I include some reflections on my experience as a state regulator some fifty  years 
ago and as an observer and supporter of improved and expanded state regulation ever since 
then. Regulation of charities has two overriding purposes: (1) to assure accountability of 
fiduciaries and protect charitable assets, and (2) as part of a program of consumer protection to 
prevent misleading or fraudulent solicitations. This paper focuses on how the present scheme of 
state regulation developed, how and where it fits with federal regulation, and suggestions from 
scholars and practitioners as to how it might be improved. Finally, although my record for 
predicting changes is very poor, I will provide some surmises as to the future.  
 
I. Historical Context of Charities Oversight by States 
 
My first experience with state charity regulation was in 1960 when I was appointed an 
assistant attorney general in Massachusetts, and a member of and later the Director of the 
Division of Public Charities in the Office of the Attorney General. Our powers stemmed from a 
statute passed in 1954, enlarging on the long standing duty of the attorney general to assure the 
“due application of funds given or appropriated to public charities within the Commonwealth 
and prevent breaches in the administration thereof.”               
   
The statute established the Division, required all charities in the state other than religious 
ones to register with the Division and file annual reports detailing activities and finances, and 
expanded the Attorney General’s power to conduct investigations. Under a separate statute 
enacted in the mid-1950s, charities  soliciting funds from the general public, professional fund-
raisers and solicitors were also required to register and file separate reports about their 
campaigns, and individuals handling contributions were required to post bonds. Until 1954, these 
records were handled in the criminal division in the office of the attorney general, but were 
transferred to the Charity Division upon its establishment in 1954.  
 
We had a staff of five, two assistant attorneys general, one legal clerk, an executive 
secretary and a secretary-clerk. Investigators and accountants were assigned on an ad hoc basis 
to the Division when needed.  Our duties included maintaining the register, monitoring the 
content of the annual filings, to monitor filings from charities intending to conduct public 
solicitations and issue licenses to professional solicitors, and investigate and prosecute breaches 
                                                          







of duty by charitable trustees. In addition to these functions, we made a major effort to find 
nonfilers, we revised the reporting forms and sought court approval to consolidate a large 
number of charitable trusts with bank trustees whose fees absorbed any income generated by the 
assets and were, accordingly not supporting or conducting any charitable activities.  
 
 We also sought community support for our efforts, establishing an Advisory Committee 
comprised of 30 representatives of the charitable, financial and legal sectors from across the state 
who helped us consider ways to improve the various aspects of our work, including drafting new 
legislation to improve the operations of the Division. Subsequent attorneys general continued to 
constitute and rely on advisory committees until the 1980s. (Illinois and Michigan now require 
their establishment by statute). In addition we received two grants from the Boston Foundation, 
first to support publication of a list of private foundations in the state, followed by one with a list 
of all public charities registered with the Division, in both cases with contact information.  
 
All of the foregoing was positive. The other side was the difficulty of identifying abuses 
unless they were brought to our attention by whistleblowers or the press, and once we had 
determined that there were abuses to be corrected, the difficulty of bringing some court actions 
with the limited staff and funds we had available. Nonetheless, we were able to prosecute 
successfully a number of charities who were misapplying charitable funds, and we handled a 
number of important cy pres and deviation cases.  
 
I left the Charity Division at the end of 1962 following a change in administration, and 
then embarked on a study of state and federal regulation of private foundations, the results of 
which were published in 1964 by Russell Sage Foundation in a book entitled Foundations and 
Government: State and Federal Law and Supervision. 
 
In 1964, the year in which my book was published, mandatory registration and reporting 
statutes were in effect in the office of the attorney general in ten states: New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Ohio, Massachusetts, Iowa, California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Oregon. Rhode 
Island and South Carolina required reports only from trusts, not corporations. The Iowa statute 




 The rationale for these mandatory reporting laws was that, while state laws in almost 
every state charged the attorney general with oversight of charities, without a reporting statute he 
would have no knowledge of the charities under his jurisdiction, let alone what their activities 
were. 
State regulation of charitable fund raising was also within the jurisdiction of the attorney 
general, but it proceeded along a different path than that of attorney general regulation of 
fiduciaries. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, national and state health and welfare agencies 
became aware of an increase in misleading solicitations and instances of fraudulent campaigns. 
They led an effort to obtain state legislation to regulate fund raising activities and their efforts 
resulted in passage during the 1960s of legislation in 26 state requiring registration and reporting 
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by charities of specific campaigns to raise funds, and licensing of professional fund raisers and 
paid solicitors. In some states such as Massachusetts and New York, the duties imposed on the 
attorney general were carried out within the same office as charity registration and reporting. In 
others, it was the secretary of state or the state welfare commission that was charged with 
administration of the statutes. Later, as consumer protection became an established function for 
an attorney general’s office, regulation of charitable fund raising became an important 
component of those programs.  Today there are 38 states in which fund-raising is regulated, 
although press reports of scandals involving fundraising activities by charities and for profit 
organizations that claim to be charities continue to appear with some regularity. A major 
problem for the regulators has been the inability to adequately prosecute charities, and so-called 
charities, that operate in a number of states or nation- wide and have the ability to move from 
one jurisdiction to another when attempts are made to prosecute them. 
         
Of the nine states that require annual financial reports from charities and continue to 
actively monitor their activities and the five or six additional ones like Pennsylvania and Texas 
that actively regulate charities, no one of them considers that its programs are well staffed and 
adequately funded. In fact, one of the first drawbacks to increasing the number of states with 
active charity regulation is the lack of funds. However, for a state in which the office of the 
attorney general has a total staff of three or four, the inability to deal adequately with charitable 
issues is understandable.  
 
 Despite the fact that the number of states actively  regulating charities has not grown in 
50 years, much has been done by way of refining the operation of charity divisions in individual 
states, clarifying statutory provisions and cooperating with other state regulators. They have had 
active support from the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of 
State Charity Officials, and the Columbia Law School National State Attorneys General 
Program's Charities Regulation and Oversight Project.. The NASCO annual conferences and the 
meetings of the Exempt Organization Committee of the ABA Tax Section have provided 
opportunities for state regulators to meet with federal regulators and members of the charitable 
sector to discuss common problems. The paper by Karin Kunstler-Goldman and Belinda Johns, 
"Evolving State Regulation: From Index Cards To the Internet", which is a part of this 
conference series of papers, contains an excellent description of the status of current regulation 
within and among the states.  
 
 There have also been important developments in state law designed to improve 
administration of charity regulation. In 2011 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted 
a Model Protection of Charitable Assets Act, having repealed the earlier promulgated Uniform 
Act for Supervision of Charitable Trusts, when it appeared that it had not been considered by any 
state legislature for more than 20 years. The change in the title of the new act reflected both 
problems relating to whether the original act covered only trustees of charitable trusts or, as was 
intended, charities organized as nonprofit corporations and unincorporated associations. The acts 
originally passed in Illinois and Michigan were amended soon after their passage to clear the 
ambiguity, while in California the change was made before passage. The Uniform Management 
of Institutional Funds Act and its successor, the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 







designed to clarify the laws governing investment of charitable funds and provide uniformity 
among the state laws as to the legal standards to which fiduciaries would be held and the basis 




During these 50 years, there have been suggestions for improving state charity regulation 
other than by increasing the information available to the attorney general and adequately staffing 
his office. One common criticism of reliance on programs run in the office of the attorney 
general is that this office is often too influenced by political considerations. It is true that state 
attorneys general are either appointed by a governor or are elected by the voters in the state. 
However, reviewing the record in these last 50 plus years, there is little evidence of political bias 
in the administration of charity regulation.  A serious example of state political interference 
occurred in Pennsylvania when the attorney general became involved in a proposed sale of the 
majority position held by the trustees of the Hershey Trust in securities of the Hershey Company. 
Concerned about the effect on the town of Hershey should the company be sold to buyers who 
would remove its operations to another venue, the Attorney General acted to stop the sale, and 
succeeded in persuading a local court to remove the trustees. He also succeeded in persuading 
the legislature to amend the state Prudent Man Rule governing investment of trust assets to 
require consideration of the effect of a sale of securities or of a company on the economy of a 
defined geographical area, a provision unique among state laws.   
 
During the early years of the 21st century, large health care organizations owning 
property in more than one state were converting to for-profit status and in two instances the 
attorneys general in those states each claimed the assets for their own jurisdiction, causing a 
number of law suites, with conflicting claims. Compromises were eventually reached, with new 
foundations being established in each of the states involved, funded with a proportion of the 
proceeds of the sale. Critics of the proceedings believed that the attorneys general had wasted 
funds on what was considered frivolous litigation, arguing that the division of assets should have 
been negotiated prior to going to court.    
 
II. Suggestions for Charities Oversight Reform 
 
Critics of regulation by attorneys general suggest that this office is not suited to handle 
cases that need  informed understanding of charity law, or that some states already cannot handle 
the large number of new charities being formed or predicted to be formed in the near future and 
others will also be unable to do so. They suggest that it would be better to transfer the powers of 
the attorney general to an independent state charity board, following the British pattern of 
regulation, with the office of the attorney general involved only when recourse to the courts is 
necessary. Kenneth Karst
3
 and James Fishman
4
 both wrote supporting such a proposal.  Both 
suggested, however, that it was unlikely to be adopted in the near future. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer 
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and Brendan M. Wilson analyzed the best situs for regulation of charities and concluded it 
should be in the states, but without a recommendation as to situs.  
 
I have always argued for increasing the funds available for charity regulation and, with 
those funds, to support increasing the number of states actively regulating charities, while 
improving existing programs. One suggestion made in my 1964 book was for the federal 
government to provide a financial incentive to states to establish new or improve existing 
regulatory programs, using as precedent the administration of the unemployment compensation 
laws under which the federal governments has established minimum standards and requirements 
for their administration, which if adopted in any state results in a federal subsidy to the state to 
administer the program. Once a state program meets the federal standards federal action is 
confined to assuring that they are observed. There are other ways to provide financial incentives 
from the federal government, the decision as to whether they might ever be considered is quite 
clearly a political one.     
  
In 2004, the Senate Finance Committee Staff issued a report containing recommendations 
for reforming oversight of charities. Included in a long list of recommendations for adopting 
changes in the administration of federal regulation of charities was one that called for providing 
federal funding to the states to establish or improve their regulation of charities. The Report 
suggested conditioning federal funding on a state adopting uniform filing requirements and 
minimum standards for oversight and enforcement. This proposal was adopted by the Panel on 
the Nonprofit Sector, established to respond to the Finance Committee staff recommendations 
under the leadership of Independent Sector. However, nearly 10 years later, with the exception of 
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code to further increase regulation of supporting 
organizations and credit counseling charities, no action has been take on the recommendations 
from either group.  
 
The possibility of removing oversight of charities from the IRS to a separate national 
agency or to another existing federal agency such as the SEC, has been suggested by a number of 
scholars and observers of the charitable sector. Some of them suggest what would be federal 
preemption of charity regulation. Others have suggested, as did the Senate Finance Committee 
Staff Report, enhanced cooperation between the two levels of government. In his paper for this 
series entitled “Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach”, Marcus Owens has proposed 
creation of a new quasi-independent board to determine eligibility for exemption and to police 
charities. He does suggest that this new charity regulatory organization might support state 
charity regulation efforts “where appropriate,” but otherwise does not address state regulation.     
 
 Two other recommendations from the Finance Committee Staff that received support of 
the state regulators and many commentators were (1) to improve the ability of the IRS to 
exchange information about pending cases with state regulators, and (2) to permit abatement of 
federal sanctions if the state attorney general and the state courts with jurisdiction over the 
charity were taking action to rectify alleged misdeeds. These are discussed in the following 








III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHARITIES AND THE INTERPLAY WITH STATE 
REGULATION 
The underlying focus of federal regulation of charities is protection of the tax system 
from abuses by entities granted special privileges, namely tax exemptions and eligibility to 
receive tax deductable contributions. Actually, very little attention was paid to exempt charities 
until the late 1940s, when an annual reporting requirement was imposed by regulation, a 
requirement that was not widely observed.  In 1950, Congress enacted the tax on unrelated 
business income of charities, required annual reporting from larger charities, and placed some 
limits on self dealing and accumulations of income on the group of exempt organizations that 
were later to be described in the Internal Revenue Code as private foundations.  
 
 As noted above, the only sanction for failure to comply with Internal Revenue Code 
provisions governing charities was loss of exemption, an entirely inappropriate sanction under 
which, if the state with jurisdiction did not act, meant that the fiduciaries who violated their 
duties could remain in place and continue the behavior that caused loss of exemption. The 
regulations promulgated in 1959, which included an organizational test, provided the basis for 
what has become a uniform law for charities in all jurisdictions, superseding any state laws that 
might not conform to the federal provisions. However,  enforcement remained sporadic and the 
agents assigned to exempt organization cases rarely had training in the laws applicable to 
charities; rather, their expertise was in dealing with for-profit, taxable entities.  
 
Passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 required a change in enforcement, as personnel 
with knowledge of its complicated provisions were needed to effectively audit the affected 
charities. This Act contained two specific provisions recognizing the role of the states and state 
law in charity governance. The most important of these was the provisions in section 507 of the 
IRS, under which the extreme penalty for violation of the restrictions of private foundations, a 
tax equal to all the foundations assets, could be abated if the Service had evidence that a state 
had taken corrective action to assure that the charity’s assets would be preserved. The second 
related to a requirement that private foundations include in their governing documents provisions 
mandating that they comply with the restrictions in the Internal Code on their activities. An 
exception was made to this requirement if the state laws governing the foundation required such 
compliance. By 1964 all of the states and D.C. had enacted such legislation,  Small in 
comparison to the large number of new limits on foundations, but nonetheless unique in charity 
regulation.  
 
 Unique also in the 1969 Tax Reform Act was the nature of the sanctions applicable for 
violation of the newly enacted restrictions. Instead of loss of tax exemption as the first level of 
sanctions, as it had been and still  remained in regard to the universe of publicly supported 
charities, in the case of the prohibition against self-dealing, excise taxes could be applied to the 
self-dealer personally and to the fiduciaries of the charity who, knowingly and willfully, 
approved the transaction. Note that this tax did not apply to the charity’s asses. In the case of the 
other restrictions, a mandatory annual pay out, a limit on business holdings, a requirement that 
investments comply with the "prudent man rule", (a rule developed under state law,) and a 
prohibition against any political activity or any expenditure other than for a charitable purpose, 







knowingly and willfully approved the expenditures. The Act also included increased reporting 
requirements for all charities. 
 
As described in Owens’ paper, there were important changes within the Internal Revenue 
Service, notably after passage of the 1969 Act, particularly the establishment of  a separate 
division within the Service under the direction of an Assistant Commissioner for tax exempt and 
governmental organizations, with personnel trained to understand the separate set of rules 
applicable to these entities; the establishment of an Advisory Committee to the Assistant 
Commissioner to bring the views of practitioners and representatives of charities to his attention; 
and, as noted below, a new provision relating to cooperation with state regulators, namely a 
requirement that the IRS include in its new reporting forms requests for information helpful to 
the state regulators. 
 
In 1994, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, testifying before Congress, requested 
new legislation that would provide more appropriate sanctions than revocation of exemption for 
the large universe of publically supported charities. In the following year Treasury proposed and 
Congress enacted provisions, described as “intermediate sanctions”, imposing excise taxes on 
fiduciaries of publicly supported charities and certain of their donors and their families if they 
received “excess benefits” from the charity. The restrictions are similar in effect to the self-
dealing provisions applicable to private foundations, but somewhat more lenient in that the tax is 
on the value of the excess benefit rather than on the value of the entire self dealing transaction as 
is the case with the private foundation tax.  
 
In 2008, the IRS revised Form 990, the annual report for public charities, and instituted a 
new enforcement effort, aimed at improving the governance practices of charities. This program 
reflected a new understanding of the importance of state rules governing fiduciary duties. With 
the changes in Form 990, the IRS also announced that it was preparing to institute electronic 
filing, mandated by statute in 2006. However, as Owens describes, the exempt organization 
division of the IRS suffered severe budget cuts, that together with internal constraints stemming 
from the general operation of the IRS meant that since the start of the 21st century has meant 
there has been fewer audits and far less guidance in the way of published rulings and revenue 
procedures than both the regulators and the charities felt adequate for successful regulation.   
  
Critics of existing federal and state regulation have long stressed the need for meaningful 
cooperation between state officials and the IRS in regard to specific matters under investigation 
by the IRS. However, the traditional position of the IRS was that it could only provide 
information to state tax authorities where there were safeguards against disclosure of classified 
information. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contained a provision specifically authorizing the IRS 
to notify state charity regulators with respect to determinations relating to the denial or 
revocation of tax exemption of charities in their jurisdiction. It was anticipated that this measure 
would mean that state attorneys general would have information that would help them assure the 
protection of charitable assets of an organization losing, or failing to gain, exemption. However, 
Treasury regulations promulgated under this section effectively undermined the statute by 
interpreting the word “determination” to mean a final determination. This meant that no 







completed, a date at which it would most likely be far too late for the state to take effective 
action to save the charity’s assets.  
 
Legislation to correct this problem was included in the Pension Protection act of 2006, 
but what was in the bill as finally passes, was a provision that the IRS could not provide 
information to a state regulatory agency other than its tax department until the state had formally 
requested it on a specific matter, even though it was unlikely that the state would have 
knowledge sufficient to make such a request. A third attempt was made to remove the limitation 
on information sharing in a bill passed in 2007 under which the final determination requirement 
was removed. For those who thought that meaningful information sharing by the IRS would now 
be possible, their expectations were misplaced; the IRS interpreted the newest version of the 
statute as requiring state officials receiving information to acknowledge their potential liability if 
any federal privacy limitations were violated. Sharing required that the states sign agreements to 
protect privacy, a requirement that some states were not willing to accept. Thus, again, attempts 
to improve the nature of the information that can be exchanged were thwarted.  
 
There is another section of the Internal Revenue Code in which cooperation with state 
regulators was contemplated, that could serve as a model for wider inclusion in the Code. It is 
section 507(g)(2), enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 applicable to private 
foundations who have incurred liability for violation of any of the private foundation restrictions 
and there have been either willful repeated acts or failures to act, or a willful and flagrant act 
giving rise to liability for the excise tax. The penalty prescribed for such a violation is a tax equal 
to the lower of all of the tax benefits ever received by the foundation since its inception or all of 
its net assets. Subsection (g) provides for abatement of this confiscatory tax “if following formal 
notification to an appropriate State Officer within one year, he notifies the  Secretary of the 
Treasury that corrective action has been initiated pursuant to State law to insure that the assets of 
the foundation involved are preserved for such charitable or other purposes specified in section 
501(c)(3)as may be ordered or approved by a court of competent jurisdiction and upon 
completion of the corrective action, the Secretary receives certification from the appropriate 
State officer that the action has resulted in the preservation of the foundation’s assets. 
 
It does not appear that this section has been used to protect a foundation’s assets. 
However, it is the nature of the provision that is important in that it would be as appropriate in 
regard to any instance in which the assets of a charity will be subject to what amounts to federal 
confiscation, as, obviously, if a state attorney general and a state court can succeed in preserving 
the charity’s assets for continued public benefit, that would appear to be a more beneficial 
outcome. More widespread adoption of such a provision was one of the recommendations of the 
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, but otherwise it has not received specific attention in the literature 
or from the regulators.  
 
In 2006 I published a paper suggesting that it was time to amend the Internal Revenue 
Code so that private foundations and public charities were treated more alike.
5
 Specifically, I 
suggested that the payout rule might be made applicable to charitable endowments, and that the 
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prudent man rule in Chapter 42 should be updated to mesh with the provisions in the Uniform 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act and made applicable to publicly supported 
charities, and that the rule regulating taxable expenditures could similarly be extended. These 
recommendations have not been taken up by others, but the limits on supporting organizations 
contained in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 indicate that Congress and the Treasury were 
not reluctant to consider broadening the application of the private foundation rules to one group 
of public charities. The problem of course is that this legislation created a third class of charities 
with its own set of limits, instead of simplifying the Code as I had suggested.  
 
During the period I have been describing, there have been important changes within the 
charitable sector itself  designed to improve federal and state regulation. The most important one 
in terms of assisting both the regulators and the charitable universe, as well potential donors, has 
been the programs of a charity called GuideStar. This organizations was established in 1994 with 
the purpose of making charitable giving more efficient by providing easily accessible 
information on the universe of charities. In 1996 it published the GuideStar Directory of 
American Charities, as a CD with a printed index that contained copies of the federal reporting 
forms from 35,000 charities. Later that year it created a website that since then has published 
information on all charities exempt under section 501(c)(3), taken from the IRS Business Master 
File. In 1998 and 1999 it began posting forms 990 and 990EZ for all public charities. By 2005, it 
had included all tax-exempt organizations registered with the IRS. Starting in 2007, it made it 
possible for donors to make donations from its website, and since then it has increased the 
amount and  nature of information available to the public, notably regarding evaluation of the 
impact of a charity’s activities, its financial status and a compilation of executive compensation. 
In 2001, New Mexico, without a statute mandating reporting by charities established an on line 
Charities Research Service with a customized version of the GuideStar database and search 
engine. In 2004 the California office of the Attorney General adopted a similar service on its 
website. At the start of 2014, the GuideStar data base included 1.8 million IRS recognized tax-
exempt organizations, and 3.2 million digitized Form 990 records.  
 
 The importance of the contributions of GuideStar cannot be overstated, as the computer 
system available to the IRS was not capable of providing this information in the early 2000s and, 
and as noted above, it has been subject to budget constraints for at least 20 years that have 
limited its computer capabilities, along with but the number of published rulings and other 
guidance it has issued.  
 
Developments in both federal and state regulation, particularly those enacted since the 
start of the 21st century have strengthened and improved the operations of both the IRS and state 
regulators, even with the financial constraints faced by  the regulators.  However, in the spring of 
2013 the Exempt Organization division came under public scrutiny due to a development not 
directly related to regulation of charities, but rather to that of a group of organizations exempt 
from taxation under section 501(c)(4), but not entitled to receive tax deductible contribution. 
Referred to in the regulations as Civic Leagues and Social Welfare Organizations, these 
organizations, unlike charities are permitted to conduct unlimited lobbying activities and, a 
certain amount of political campaign activity, activity that exempt charities may not conduct.  







unusual increase in the number of applications for exemption under section (c)(4), including a 
large number from local Tea Party chapters and other similar organizations came to the attention 
of the Congress, with the result that the Acting Commissioner of the IRS and the Assistant 
Commissioner for Exempt Organizations and Government Entities resigned, and there followed 
a significant restructuring of the IRS exempt organization division staff. The matter received 
extensive media coverage and it was unclear at the end of the year what its effect would be on 
IRS regulation of all tax exempt entities.  
 
Proposals for reforming federal regulation of charities have ranged from improving 
administration within the IRS, to proposals, such as that of Marcus Owens, to remove the active 
administration of the Code provisions from the IRS to a separate body with enforcement powers 
similar to those held by state attorneys general and with equity powers granted to the federal 
courts to assist in the correction of abuses. In the past I have advocated retaining regulation 
within the IRS, with adoption of measures that would increase the role of the states in 
enforcement by melding federal and state powers, and improving administration within the IRS. 
The revelations in 2013 of the inability of the IRS to manage a major increase in applications for 
exemption under section 501(c)(4) requires a reassessment of this position, one that I believe is 
not yet possible for me to do.  
     
IV. THE FUTURE OF STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHARITIES. 
Having been a very poor prognosticator in regard to state charity regulation during the 
last 50 or so years, I am reluctant to try again. However, developments in regulation during the 
period just described, as well as the vast changes afforded by the availability of the internet to 
disseminate information provide some help while forecasting the future. I have expanded my 
original assignment to discuss state regulation, as I hope I have made apparent, is my belief that 
the future of state regulation will be strongly effected by what happens to federal regulation. The 
use of IRS information in New Mexico and California already demonstrates that a state does not 
need to maintain a separate registry. With the phase in of the requirement that large charities 
must use electronic filing, this will make information for state regulators available from both the 
Service and GuideStar. The exception to this is information relating to solicitation of funds from 
the public but, as noted below, I do not think this will or should remain one of the principal 
duties of an attorney general. 
 
I believe it is possible that there will be a new agency, whether governmental or quasi-
self-regulatory to enforce federal and state laws governing charities. It is also possible that the 
federal courts will be granted equity powers to govern charitable activity and charitable 
fiduciaries. If that does come about, it could well lead to the demise of state regulation, or in any 
event a great reduction in state activity. My hope is that this will not be the case, as I believe 
there is great benefit in having a state attorney general and the local courts to formulate the most 
appropriate resolutions to cases involving protection of charitable assets and prosecution of 
violations of fiduciary duties. In fact, there will be some residual questions, certainly those 
involving real property, which will likely require that a state court be involved. I would not 
predict that it will occur, but I hope that there will be some subsidy from a federal entity to 







lead to uniformity among the states in regard to the laws governing charities as well as the nature 
and extent of regulatory activity. 
 
In regard to regulation of solicitations, although the IRS does request information on its 
application for exemption and Form 990 as to how funds are raised, it does not have specific 
powers to regulate solicitations, nor is it suited to do so. However, the burden on charities that 
raise funds in several or all the states is sufficiently heavy that I believe there will be federal 
preemption of this aspect of activity by charities. I have suggested in the past and still believe 
that federal regulation of fundraising fits most rationally within the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission. The Commission already regulates for-profit organizations that hold 
themselves out as charities, so that it would not be a severe extension of its jurisdiction to 
entirely unknown entities. Here again, there could be deferral of federal sanctions if a state is 
taking corrective action to protect charitable assets, but there is no reason why a charity must 
register in every state while conducting a mail or email solicitation, including a lottery mailing. 
Although not necessarily in the immediate future, I think it likely that almost all solicitations will 
be made on the internet and the existing question of when a charity needs to register in a given 
state, or all 38 that now regulate fund raising, will become moot.  
 
The foregoing predictions presuppose that the charitable sector will continue to grow. 
However, if the sector should shrink, possibly as a result of reductions of tax incentives or a 
changes from an income tax to a VAT or consumption tax, there will likely be less federal 
enforcement as a matter of tax administration. Whether this will mean that federal regulation will 
be transferred to another existing or new agency is, as I have noted, beyond my power to predict. 
I do believe, however, that the future role of state regulation will be determined by the course 
that federal regulation takes, so again I cannot make a prediction in that regard.  
 
A final prediction:  unless we as a society can overcome the propensity of some few of 
our members to steal and of others to take improper advantage of positions given to them as 
fiduciaries, we will continue to need individuals of the type we are now lucky to have as 
regulators; individuals dedicated to preserving the integrity of the charitable sector, regardless of 
where they are situated, what problems they face in imposing sanctions, and what the size of the 
sector may be.  
 
 
